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Interpretation of Article V of the New
York Convention in the Eleventh Circuit:
Industrial Risk Insurers
JUAN C. GARCIA & IVAN BRACHO GONZALEZ*
The widespread use and growing preference for international arbitration over cross-border litigation is primarily
due to the existence of a clear and straightforward regime
for the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards.
Even though this was not always the case, through the appearance of the New York Convention and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, the treatment and acceptance of international
arbitration in different legal regimes has undergone a harmonization process which has served to develop consistency.
That harmonization process, however, has not been completed. Several jurisdictions, even within their own borders, apply and interpret the New York Convention differently. One
example of those jurisdictions is the United States, where federalism allows that federal law be applied in a non-consistent manner by different federal circuit courts of appeals. In
particular, this Article analyzes the persistent notion developed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, which has held and confirmed that the grounds for
annulment of a foreign arbitral award—or awards with a foreign component—are those listed in the New York
*
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Convention and not those contemplated by federal law. The
case, Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte
GmbH, represents a divorce from longstanding precedent
from other circuit courts of appeals, which have correctly
and repeatedly held that the grounds for refusing enforcement of an award found in the New York Convention cannot
be considered as grounds for annulment.
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Law is a species of order, and hence good law necessarily implies good order.1

I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ON THE ENFORCEMENT AND
ANNULMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
As international arbitration experienced exponential growth in
the early twentieth century, the enforcement of international arbitral

1
THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 174 (J.E.C. Weldon trans., MacMillan and
Co. 1901).
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awards depended almost entirely on comity.2 Under one view of this
regime, known as “Comity of Nations,” the enforcement of foreign
legislative, executive, or judicial acts, including arbitral awards, was
left to the discretion of the courts of the nation where enforcement
was sought.3 According to this theory, courts enforced foreign judgments and awards as a courtesy to foreign states.4 This enforcement
regime did not serve arbitration well.5 Without an international
framework establishing a unified procedure for the enforcement of
arbitral awards, parties had no certainty whether awards would be
enforced and the parties allowed to collect the judgment.6 Without
such certainty, parties would be reluctant to resolve their disputes
through arbitration.7
During the 1920s, two seminal treaties, the Geneva Protocol on
Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 (collectively, the “Geneva Conventions”) were enacted to facilitate enforcement of both
arbitration clauses and arbitral awards, with the goal of making international arbitration a viable and effective dispute resolution
method.8 The Geneva Conventions established a regime under
which parties from different jurisdictions could enforce arbitration
clauses and awards in virtually any jurisdiction.9
The procedural framework established by the Geneva Conventions, however, soon became burdensome and complex. Parties
seeking enforcement of arbitral awards were required to seek confirmation of the award in the jurisdiction where, or under the laws
of which, the award was issued before being able to seek enforcement abroad.10 This “double exequatur” regime was cumbersome
2

JACOB VAN DE VALDEN, FINALITY IN LITIGATION: THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF PRECLUSION – RES JUDICATA (MERGER AND ESTOPPEL), ABUSE OF PROCESS
AND RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 238–42 (2017).
3

Id.
Id.
5
W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 8–9 (1995).
6
Id. at 8.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 9.
9
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1967,
92 L.N.T.S. 302, 305–06 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
10
Id.
4
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and caused delay because the party seeking enforcement would first
need to initiate an action to confirm the award where it was issued,
known as the seat of the arbitration, and then bring a second action
in the foreign jurisdiction in which enforcement was sought.11
In order to eliminate the need to confirm the award in two jurisdictions, the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (“New York Convention”
or “Convention”) created a simplified regime allowing the enforcement of both arbitration agreements and arbitration awards. 12 With
respect to the enforcement of awards, the New York Convention’s
framework allows a successful party in an international arbitration
to enforce the award in any jurisdiction where the losing party has
assets, provided that such jurisdiction is a contracting state to the
Convention, without first confirming the award at the arbitral seat.13
The Convention also sets forth the grounds that may be invoked
by a party opposing enforcement of the award and the grounds that
can be raised ex officio by the court in which enforcement is sought
to deny the enforcement of an award.14 The Convention, therefore,
governs both enforcement and denial of enforcement of an arbitral
award.15 The Convention, however, does not establish grounds for
the annulment or vacatur of arbitral awards and does not apply to
annulment proceedings.16
Denying enforcement of an arbitral award is very different from
annulling or vacating an award, and the two concepts are not interchangeable.17 Each concept grants the parties distinct legal rights

11

Id.
May Lu, The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Analysis of the Seven Defenses to Oppose Enforcement in the United States and England, 23 ARIZ. J. OF INT’L AND COMP. LAW 747,
749 (2006).
13
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, arts. III–IV, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
14
Id. art. V(2).
15
See id.
16
ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958: AN
OVERVIEW 4 (last visited April 22, 2020) https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12125884227980/new_york_convention_of_1958_
overview.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
17
Id.
12
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and is subject to different legal and procedural requirements.18 The
difference between the two concepts is best understood by analyzing
the actions parties may take after an arbitral tribunal issues its
award.19
If the losing party does not voluntarily comply with the terms of
the award, the winning party may seek to enforce the award either
in the jurisdiction where the award was issued (the arbitral seat) or
in any other jurisdiction where the losing party has assets. 20 Conversely, the losing party may oppose enforcement of the award in
any of the jurisdictions where the winning party seeks to enforce,
based on the grounds established in the New York Convention. 21
The losing party may also seek to vacate or annul the award at the
seat of the arbitration.22 The procedure and grounds for annulling
the award are established by the lex arbitri, or the law of the seat of
the arbitration, rather than by the New York Convention.23
Each mechanism also has a different legal effect on the arbitral
award.24 Annulment or vacatur of an award, according to the general
rule adopted by most courts throughout the world, annuls the award
and precludes it from having any legal effect whatsoever.25 This approach, known as Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit, stands for the proposition that,
once the award is annulled by a court of the seat of the arbitration—
or primary jurisdiction—it cannot produce any legal effects because
“nothing comes from nothing.”26 As such, an award that has been
annulled at the seat cannot then be enforced in another jurisdiction.
18

Id.
Id. at 4, 13–14.
20
Lu, supra note 12, at 748.
21
Id. at 748, 755.
22
VAN DEN BERG, supra note 16, at 4.
23
Claudia Salomon & Irina Sivachenko, Choosing an Arbitral Seat in the
United States (last visited Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.lw.com/
thoughtLeadership/choosing-an-arbitral-seat-in-the-us (explaining that the “Lex
Arbitri” or “Lex Loci Arbitri” refers to the law of the seat or the place of arbitration); see New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(e) (stating that the seat
can be defined as the country “in which, or under the law of which, [the] award
was made”).
24
William W. Park, The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction,
V. Items for Further Consideration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2006: BACK
TO BASICS? 112, 127 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2007).
25
Id.
26
Id.
19
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To the contrary, when a court in an enforcing jurisdiction refuses
or denies the enforcement of an award, such denial does not alter the
legal status of the award.27 In other words, a denial of enforcement
does not annul the award nor preclude its subsequent enforcement
in another jurisdiction.28
Consequently, courts at the seat of arbitration play an important
role in the annulment process as they are the “competent authority,”
as envisaged by the Convention, tasked with deciding annulment
petitions.29 Accordingly, courts deciding annulment or enforcement
petitions must have a clear understanding of the relevant framework
applicable to these proceedings, because as described above, each
cause of action is different and will have a different effect upon the
award, and the parties’ rights.
Given the crucial role played by courts at the seat, this chapter
will address an exceptional instance in which a federal appellate
court in the United States “conflated” the grounds for denying enforcement and vacating arbitral awards.30 More specifically, it will
analyze a unique case from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit (“Eleventh Circuit”) where the court ignored
the distinction between the denial of enforcement and annulment of
arbitral awards previously established by other circuit courts in the

27

Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Under the ICSID
and New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. INT’L L. & POL. 175, 196 (1995).
28
It must be noted that the general rule on enforcement of awards is that once
an award has been annulled at the legal seat of the arbitration, it cannot be enforced in any other jurisdiction. However, there have been some instances in
which courts of secondary jurisdiction have allowed enforcement of awards that
were previously annulled. Yet, the issue of enforcement of awards notwithstanding their annulment has generated a hotly debate among scholars and courts, and
consensus on the matter has not been reached.
29
See New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1) (stating that “[r]ecognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority
where the recognition and enforcement is sought.”) (emphasis added). However,
that is not to say that courts at the seat will not decide motions from parties resisting enforcement, as that could be the case.
30
Juan C. Garcia, Juliana de Valdenebro & Daniela Tagtachian, A Legal
Framework Is Only as Good as Its Implementation: The Conflation of Grounds
for Denying Enforcement and Vacating Arbitral Awards in Industrial Risk,
XXXIII(3) INT’L L.Q. 22, 23 (2017).
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United States, and thus failed to properly identify the grounds for
vacatur.
It must be noted at the outset that the grounds for annulment or
vacatur in most jurisdictions mirror the grounds for refusing enforcement under the New York Convention, and as such it may appear as the distinction is one of no consequence. That is not the case,
however, in the United States, and therefore ignoring the distinction
between vacatur and denial of enforcement can have significant consequences.31
II.

ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS UNDER THE NEW
YORK CONVENTION
As mentioned in Part I, the New York Convention was intended
to simplify the burdensome and lengthy process of enforcement of
international arbitral awards under the Geneva Conventions. In order to promote efficiency, the Convention sets forth an exclusive list
of grounds upon which a court may deny enforcement of an award.32
Article V(1) of the Convention establishes that “[r]ecognition
and enforcement of the award may be refused . . . only if that party
[opposing enforcement] furnishes to the competent authority where
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof” that one of the
grounds listed therein is present. 33 In other words, a court must enforce an international arbitral award unless the party resisting enforcement successfully proves that one of the grounds for refusing
enforcement.
The exclusive grounds for denying enforcement of an award under Article V(1) of the Convention include the following:
1. Recognition and Enforcement of the award may be
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is
invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement is
sought, proof that:

31
32
33

Id. at 22–23.
Craig, supra note 5, at 10.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1).
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(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article
II were, under the law applicable to them, under
some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid
under law to which the parties have subjected it or,
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the
country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was
not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitration or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decision on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not
submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the
law which, that award was made.34
Additionally, Article V(2) lists the grounds upon which courts
of the enforcing jurisdiction can rely ex officio to deny enforcement.
Article V(2) provides the following:
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
may also be refused if the competent authority in the
34

Id. (emphasis added).
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country where recognition and enforcement is sought
finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable
of settlement by arbitration under the law of that
country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that country.35
As noted above, the grounds included in the Convention are only
available to parties opposing enforcement of an arbitral award. The
Convention does not establish grounds for the annulment of arbitral
awards.36 Although the Convention does not explicitly distinguish
between denial of enforcement and annulment of an award, Article
V(1)(e) implicitly recognizes this distinction, providing that a party
may
oppose
enforcement
of
an
award
when
“[t]he award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in
which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”37 Article
V(1)(e) presupposes the existence of a different procedure for annulment by the courts of the seat of the arbitration in accordance
with the laws of the seat.
This distinction is consistent with the contracting parties’ concern that including grounds for annulment in the Convention could
impact their sovereignty and ability to regulate their internal matters.38 As recognized by Leonard V. Quigley, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, in an article published merely three years
after the creation of the Convention:
Significantly, [Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention] fails to specify the grounds upon which the
rendering State may set aside or suspend the award.
While it would have provided greater reliability to
35

Id. art. V(2).
VAN DEN BERG, supra note 16, at 4.
37
See New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(e) (emphasis added).
38
Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70
YALE L.J. 1049, 1069–70 (1961).
36
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the enforcement of awards under the Convention had
the available grounds been defined in some way,
such action would have constituted meddling with
national procedure for handling domestic awards, a
subject beyond the competence of the Conference.39
In short, including grounds for annulment in the Convention
would have imposed upon the Convention an “authority and scope
which the document’s framers and signatory states not only did not
intend, but likely did not foresee.”40
III.
VACATUR OR ANNULMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
In a typical international arbitration, the parties specify the juridical seat of the arbitration in the arbitration agreement.41 The seat
of arbitration, in turn, determines the procedural law for the conduct
of the arbitration, also known as the lex arbitri.42 In other words,
“the local courts of the seat of arbitration may, depending on the local law, have the opportunity to intervene to designate the arbitral
tribunal grant interim measures, or, rule on applications to set aside
or vacate awards.”43 Therefore, the seat determines the law that will
be applied to applications or motions to vacate or annul arbitral
awards.
A. Annulment framework in jurisdictions following the UNCITRAL
Model Law
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration on June 21, 1985, for the purpose of
“assist[ing] States in reforming and modernizing their laws on arbitral procedure so as to take into account the particular features and

39

Id. at 1070.
Harout Jack Samra, Two to Tango: Domestic Grounds for Vacatur Under
the New York Convention, 20(3) AM. REV. INT’L ARB., 367, 379 (2009).
41
Salomon & Sivachenko, supra note 23.
42
Id.
43
LUCY FERGUSON REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 1, 14
(2010).
40
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needs of international commercial arbitration.”44 The Model Law,
with its subsequent amendment of 2006, “reflects worldwide consensus on key aspects of international arbitration practice having
been accepted by States of all regions and the different legal or economic systems of the world.”45
Though not binding in nature, the Model Law proposes a text
that states are free to adopt as their domestic arbitral law. 46 Indeed,
with limited modifications in some jurisdictions, the Model Law has
been adopted by eighty nations.47 In jurisdictions in which it has
been adopted in whole or in part, the Model Law constitutes the lex
arbitri, which as stated above, sets forth the framework for annulment or vacatur of arbitration awards.
Regarding annulment, article 34 of the Model Law establishes
“the application for setting aside as [the] exclusive recourse against
[an] arbitral award,” and lists the grounds upon which courts at the
seat of arbitration can rely on to annul or vacate an award.48 Notably,
article 34 lists the exact same grounds for annulment that are found
in article V of the New York Convention for denying enforcement
of an award.49
Given that the grounds for denying enforcement under the New
York Convention are identical to the grounds for annulment under
the Model Law, any distinction between the two mechanisms may
seem meaningless. While this may be the case in jurisdictions where
the Model Law has been adopted as lex arbitri without any modifications, ignoring the key distinctions between denying enforcement
and annulment may have significant consequences in jurisdictions
44

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985)
with Amendments as Adopted in 2006, UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L
TRADE LAW, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial
_arbitration (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law
Webpage]; see generally UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (UNITED NATIONS 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW].
45
UNCITRAL Model Law Webpage, supra note 44.
46
See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 44.
47
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985)
with Amendments as Adopted in 2006, UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L
TRADE LAW, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial
_arbitration/status (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law
Status].
48
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 44, art. 34.
49
Compare id., with New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V.
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in which the Model Law has not been adopted as the lex arbitri. In
these jurisdictions, grounds for vacatur may very well differ from
those established in the New York Convention regarding denial of
enforcement.50 One notable jurisdiction that has not adopted the
Model Law as its lex arbitri is the United States.51
B.
Annulment Framework in the United States
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), codified in Title 9 of the
United States Code, establishes the federal arbitral framework in the
United States. The FAA consists of three chapters. The first chapter,
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (“Chapter One”), enacted in 1925 and codified in
1947, covers domestic arbitrations and provides the grounds for annulment of a domestic arbitral award.52
The grounds to annul an arbitral award under Chapter One are
listed in Section 10 and include the following:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct
in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.53
Unlike the Model Law, the grounds for annulling an award under Chapter One of the FAA are different than those for denying
50
51
52
53

Garcia, de Valdenebro & Tagtachian, supra note 30, at 23.
Id.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2018).
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018).
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enforcement under the New York Convention.54 Moreover, over
time, courts have established non-statutory or implied grounds for
annulling arbitral awards in addition to those set forth set forth in
Chapter One of the FAA.55 These grounds, which include, among
others, “manifest disregard of the law,” have been recognized and
applied by some courts, but not accepted by others.56
The second chapter of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08 (“Chapter
Two”), which was added in 1970, incorporates the New York Convention and applies to all international, non-domestic, or foreign
awards.57 Section 202 of Chapter Two provides that an award shall
be deemed foreign or non-domestic if it has an international element
(i.e., it “involves property located abroad, envisages performance or
enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one
or more foreign states”), even if the award arises out of a relationship between two United States citizens.58 Chapter Two includes the
same grounds for denying the enforcement of an award listed in the
New York Convention but, notably, does not include any grounds
for the annulment of arbitral awards.59
Congress also included in Chapter Two a special provision,
§ 208, which provides guidance regarding how to resolve a conflict
between chapters of the FAA. 60 This provision, known as the “residual clause,” states that Chapter One may be used to fill in the gaps
in Chapter Two, allowing the application of the former as long as it
does not conflict with the latter.61 As explained below, the overwhelming majority of United States courts have consistently held,
relying on the residual clause, that the grounds for vacating an arbitral award included in Chapter One for domestic arbitrations also
54

Compare id., with New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V.
Jonathan J. Tompkins, Manifest Disregard of the Law: The Continuing
Evolution of an Historically Ambiguous Vacatur Standard, 12 DISP. RESOL. INT’L
145, 147–49 (2018).
56
See generally id. (discussion on the “manifest disregard of the law” standard).
57
9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08.
58
Garcia, de Valdenebro & Tagtachian., supra note 30, at 23.
59
9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08.
60
9 U.S.C. § 208 (providing that “Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that chapter is not in conflict with
this chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United States”).
61
Garcia, de Valdenebro & Tagtachian., supra note 30, at 23.
55
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apply to the vacatur of an international arbitral award, and that the
grounds included in Chapter Two apply only to proceedings to oppose enforcement of an award.
Finally, the FAA’s third chapter, §§ 301–07 (“Chapter Three”),
incorporates the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975 (“Panama Convention”), which was
promulgated by the Organization of American States (“OAS”) for
the purpose of creating “a viable, treaty-based system for resolving
inter-American commercial disputes by arbitration.”62 Further, it
was intended to counteract and soften the effects of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America, under the auspices of which many Latin
American states had refused to ratify the New York Convention. 63
As such, the Panama Convention, with similar provisions as those
of the New York Convention regarding recognition and enforcement
of arbitral agreements and awards, emerged as a viable alternative
to those nations who were, at the time, reluctant to adopt the latter.64
1. ANNULMENT OF “NON-DOMESTIC” AWARDS RENDERED IN
THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE FAA
In light of the framework described above, the following conclusions can be drawn regarding the application of the FAA to nondomestic, or international, arbitral awards. First, § 10 of Chapter
One is the only provision within the FAA that states or lists grounds
for annulment of arbitral awards.65 Second, § 202 of Chapter Two,
which incorporates the New York Convention, applies to foreign
and non-domestic awards, which are understood as those involving
an international element, and lists the grounds for denying the enforcement of an award contained in the New York Convention. 66
Third, § 208 of Chapter Two, known as the “residual clause,” states
that Chapter One may be used to fill in the gaps in Chapter Two,
allowing the application of the former as long as it does not conflict
62

Joseph Jackson Jr., The 1975 Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration: Scope, Application and Problems, 8 J. INT’L ARB. 91,
91–100 (1991) (quoting Charles Robert Norberg, United States Implements InterAmerican Convention on Commercial Arbitration, 45 ARB J. 23, 23 (1990)).
63
Id. at 92–94.
64
Id. at 91.
65
Garcia, de Valdenebro & Tagtachian, supra note 30, at 23.
66
Id.
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with the latter.67 Finally, Chapter Three, which incorporates the Panama Convention, also contains grounds for refusing enforcement of
awards where the parties are nationals of Latin American contracting states and the requirements for the application of the Convention
are met.68
Based on foregoing, therefore, it appears at first glance that there
are no grounds for annulment of non-domestic arbitral awards in the
FAA unless the residual clause of Chapter Three is used to “fill the
gap.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
addressed this very issue in Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys
“R” Us, Inc.69 and concluded that the grounds listed in § 10 of the
FAA for annulment actions brought against domestic awards also
apply to annulment actions relating to international or non-domestic
awards.
In Yusuf, a foreign licensee sought to confirm, under the New
York Convention, an arbitral award against Toys “R” Us, Inc. as
licensor.70 The arbitration was seated in the United States and the
proceedings involved a dispute regarding a failed license agreement
in which Toys “R” Us granted Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim and Sons,
W.L.L. a limited right to open Toys “R” Us stores throughout the
Middle East.71 After being awarded more than $46 million for lost
profits, plus interest, Alghanim sought to have the award confirmed
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York.72 Toys
“R” Us cross-moved to vacate the award under § 10 of Chapter One
of the FAA, arguing that it was clearly irrational and manifestly disregarded the law and the agreement.73 The award was considered a
non-domestic award because, even though the arbitration was seated
in the United States, the dispute “involved two nondomestic parties
and one United States corporation, and principally involved conduct
and contract performance in the Middle East.”74
The Southern District of New York held that,
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id.
Id.
126 F.3d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 1111 (1998).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 15, 18.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
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while the petition for confirmation was brought under the [New York Convention], [Toys “R” Us’]
cross-motion to vacate or modify the award was
properly brought under [Chapter One of] the Federal
Arbitration Act, and thus those claims were governed
by [Chapter One of] the Federal Arbitration Act’s
implied75 grounds for vacatur.”76
Ultimately, the district court confirmed the award and denied
Toys “R” Us’ cross-motion to vacate, finding the latter’s objections
to be without merit as the arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded
the law.77
Toys “R” Us appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that the
district court erred in finding that there had been no manifest disregard of the law by the arbitral tribunal.78 The primary issue before
the Second Circuit was whether the grounds for annulment established by Chapter One of the FAA for domestic arbitral awards, including the non-statutory or implied grounds, could be invoked
against a non-domestic award.79 The court ultimately affirmed the
district court’s holding, finding that the arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded the law.80
In so doing, the court reasoned that Article V(1)(e) of the Convention (codified as Chapter 2 of the FAA) “allow[s] a court in the
country under whose law the arbitration was conducted to apply domestic arbitral law, in this case the FAA, to a motion to set aside or
vacate the arbitral award.”81 The Court further noted that Article
V(1)(e) of the Convention does not specify grounds to vacate an
award because “had the available grounds been defined in some
way, such action would have constituted meddling with national
procedure for handling domestic awards, a subject beyond the

75
The grounds are considered “implied” because the grounds relied upon are
not expressly enumerated in Chapter One, but they have been “read into” Chapter
One based on subsequent court decisions.
76
Yusuf, 126 F.3d at 16.
77
Id. at 16–17.
78
Id. at 16, 18.
79
Id. at 20–21.
80
Id. at 25.
81
Id. at 21.
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competence of the conference.”82 The Court stated that “the language and history of the Convention” made clear that a petition to
annul a foreign award in the state where the award was rendered “is
to be governed by domestic law of the rendering state, despite the
fact that the award is non-domestic within the meaning of the Convention[.]”83
The Second Circuit then correctly distinguished between the
standards that govern annulment of a non-domestic award and the
defenses against confirmation of non-domestic award.84 The court
held as follows:
[W]e conclude that the Convention mandates very
different regimes for the review of arbitral awards (1)
in the state in which, or under the law of which, the
award was made, and (2) in other states where recognition and enforcement are sought. The Convention
specifically contemplates that the state in which, or
under the law of which, the award is made, will be
free to set aside or modify an award in accordance
with its domestic arbitral law and its full panoply of
express and implied grounds for relief. See Convention art. V(1)(e). However, the Convention is equally
clear that when an action for enforcement is brought
in a foreign state, the state may refuse to enforce the
award only on the grounds explicitly set forth in Article V of the Convention.85
The Second Circuit thus clarified the operative arbitral framework in the United States and recognized the authority of U.S. courts
to apply domestic arbitration law (namely Chapter One of the FAA
and its implied grounds) in annulment proceedings against non-domestic awards. Interestingly, the Second Circuit appears not to have
relied on the residual clause of § 208 of Chapter Two of the FAA,
but instead on the exclusive authority allocated by the Convention
to the courts of the seat to vacate or set aside awards based on their
82
83
84
85

Id. at 22 (citing Quigley, supra note 38, at 1070).
Yusuf, 126 F.3d at 23.
Id.
Id.
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domestic arbitration laws.86 The court, however, implicitly recognized the role of the residual clause because it merely concluded that
“awards may be vacated, see 9 U.S.C. § 10, or modified,”87 citing
§ 10 of Chapter One of the FAA, and applied the grounds for vacatur
of domestic awards to a non-domestic award.88 One could assume,
therefore, that the Second Circuit relied on the gap-filler provision
to fill the void between Chapter One and Chapter Two.
The Third,89 Fifth,90 and Sixth91 Circuits have endorsed the Second Circuit’s holding in Yusuf. In fact, the Fifth Circuit has gone one
step further.
In Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (“Negara II”),92 the Fifth Circuit developed key nomenclature in order to better understand the framework
applicable to enforcement and vacatur motions. The Fifth Circuit
noted:
The New York Convention provides a carefully
structured framework for the review and enforcement of international arbitral awards. Only a court in
a country with primary jurisdiction over an arbitral
award may annul that award. Courts in other countries have secondary jurisdiction; a court in a country
with secondary jurisdiction is limited to deciding
See id. (discussing the “Convention” and not the FAA).
Id.
88
Id.
89
See Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53, 618 F.3d 277, 290–92
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that application of United States law, including the domestic FAA and its vacatur standard, was warranted because the arbitration took
place in Philadelphia and the enforcement action was brought in Philadelphia).
90
See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara (“Negara I”), 335 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2003) (“By its silence on the
matter, the Convention does not restrict the grounds on which primary-jurisdiction courts may annul an award.”).
91
See Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 709
n.8 (6th Cir. 2005). Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583–84 (2008) (“[T]he
award in this case was made in the United States, and therefore Article V(1)(e)
authorizes this court to consider our domestic law, as it is the law where the award
was made.”).
92
Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara (“Negara II”), 364 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2004).
86
87
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whether the award may be enforced in that country.
The Convention “mandates very different regimes
for the review of arbitral awards (1) in the [countries]
in which, or under the law of which, the award was
made, and (2) in other [countries] where recognition
and enforcement are sought.” Under the Convention,
“the country in which, or under the [arbitration] law
of which, [an] award was made” is said to have primary jurisdiction over the arbitration award. All
other signatory states are secondary jurisdictions, in
which parties can only contest whether that state
should enforce the arbitral award. It is clear that the
district court had secondary jurisdiction and considered only whether to enforce the Award in the United
States. Article V enumerates specific grounds on
which a court with secondary jurisdiction may refuse
enforcement.93
The resulting framework applicable to awards in the United
States, in light of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Yusuf and the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion in Karaha Bodas, is therefore clear. Courts of the
jurisdiction in which the award is made, in other words, courts of
the arbitral seat, are considered courts of “primary jurisdiction” and
have the authority to annul or vacate an award on the grounds enumerated in its domestic arbitration law. All other courts are considered courts of “secondary jurisdiction” and may only enforce, or
deny enforcement, of an award based on the grounds set forth in the
Convention.
IV.
INDUSTRIAL RISK INSURERS AND THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S
CONFLATION OF GROUNDS FOR DENYING ENFORCEMENT AND
VACATING ARBITRAL AWARDS
Notwithstanding the extensive reasoning presented by the Second Circuit’s 1997 opinion in Yusuf and the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in Nagara II, the Eleventh Circuit, when faced with an identical
question as to the grounds applicable to a vacatur petition of a nondomestic award in 1998, inexplicably held that a party seeking to
93

Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
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vacate or annul an arbitral award can only rely on the grounds listed
in Article V of the Convention, which, as has been extensively discussed before, are only available to parties resisting enforcement.
The case in question, Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH,94 involved a complex commercial dispute
in which a Florida nitric acid manufacturer, Nitram, Inc. (“Nitram”),
contracted with a Texas corporation, Barnard and Burk Group, Inc.,
for the provision and installation of a tail gas expander in Nitram’s
manufacturing plant.95 The Texas corporation then contracted with
a Louisiana corporation, Barnard and Burk Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (“Barnard Group and Engineers”) to perform the engineering work for the installation.96 Barnard Group and Engineers subsequently contracted with a German turbine manufacturer, M.A.N.
Maschinefabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg AG (“MAN”), to purchase the
tail gas expander.97 As the successor-in-interest to MAN, M.A.N.
Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH (“MAN GHH”) was responsible for designing, manufacturing, and delivering the tail gas expander, and for
providing technical guidance regarding its installation.98 Barnard
Group and Engineers, on the other hand, was responsible for the
piping for the tail gas expander.99 The installed equipment subsequently crashed on two occasions.100 Industrial Risk Insurers, a
Hartford-based insurance company, had provided business risk insurance to Nitram.101 In 1985, Nitram sued both Industrial Risk Insurers and Barnard and Burk Group, Inc., arguing that one of the
two defendants was responsible for the payment of losses. 102 After
settling the state litigation, the parties agreed to submit several remaining issues to arbitration.103
At the heart of the claims in the arbitration proceedings was
whether the two wrecks were caused by Barnard Group and
94

Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434
(11th Cir. 1998).
95
Id. at 1437.
96
Id. at 1438.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 1439.
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Engineers’ design and piping or by MAN GHH’s expander.104 The
arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of MAN GHH, concluding that Barnard Group and Engineers’ design and piping caused the two
wrecks, and awarding MAN GHH costs and conversion rate compensation.105 Barnard Group and Engineers moved to annul or vacate the arbitration award at the seat of the arbitration, and specifically in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, on the grounds that “the award was ‘arbitrary and capricious’ and that the arbitration panel improperly and prejudicially admitted certain testimony and evidence.”106 The grounds, the court
interpreted, did not both fall squarely within the New York Convention, because even though the challenge pertaining to the improperly
admitted evidence could be considered to be based on Article
V(1)(d) of the Convention, the “arbitrary and capricious” challenge,
raised under Chapter 2 of the FAA, was not enumerated by the New
York Convention.107 The district court denied the motion for vacatur
and confirmed the award.108 Bernard Group and Engineers appealed
the denial of the motion for vacatur.109
On appeal, the relevant issue before the Eleventh Circuit, just as
in Yusuf, involved whether the grounds for annulment established in
Chapter One of the FAA applied to non-domestic awards.110 Contrary to what the Second Circuit had decided roughly a year before,
however, the Eleventh Circuit held that the annulment proceeding
was governed by Chapter Two, which lists the grounds for denial of
enforcement (not annulment), because Chapter Two applied to “all
arbitral awards not ‘entirely between citizens of the United States’”
and, because the award had been made “within the legal framework
of another country.”111
The court mistakenly considered that the international nature of
the award implied that all proceedings relating to it shall be governed by Chapter Two and ignored the residual clause included in
104
105
106
107

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Nitram, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 848 F. Supp. 162, 165 (M.D. Fla.

1994).
108
109
110
111

Indus. Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1439.
Id.
Id. at 1439–40.
Id. at 1440–41.
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§ 208 of that same chapter. In so doing, it also ignored the difference
between the grounds for vacating awards and those for denying enforcement of an award which the Second Circuit had considered key
in Yusuf.
The court then addressed the grounds for vacatur that could be
raised to annul a non-domestic award rendered in the United
States.112 Specifically, the court analyzed whether a non-domestic
arbitral award could be annulled on the ground that it is “arbitrary
and capricious.”113 Instead of conducting the appropriate analysis
pursuant to Article V of the Convention and the residual clause of
the FAA, which leads to an application of the grounds established
in § 10(a)(1)(4) of Chapter One, the court incorrectly concluded that
a party seeking to annul or vacate a non-domestic award can only
rely on the grounds to challenge enforcement of a non-domestic
award provided by Article V of the New York Convention.114
Applying this flawed analytical framework, the court determined that the award could not be annulled on the ground that it was
“arbitrary and capricious” because it was not one of the enumerated
defenses provided by the New York Convention.115 The court noted:
“that no defense against enforcement of an international arbitral
award under Chapter 2 of the FAA is available on the ground that
the award is ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ or on any other grounds not
specified by the Convention.”116 Surprisingly, even though the court
repeatedly cited to Yusuf, it failed to understand the distinction between vacatur petitions and motions to deny enforcement of an
award, instead applying the grounds for denial of enforcement to an
annulment petition.
V.

RECENT DECISIONS UPHOLDING OR DISTINGUISHING
INDUSTRIAL RISK
In light of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Industrial Risk,
courts within the circuit have followed its holding and applied it to

112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 1445.
Id. at 1445–46.
Id. at 1443, 1445–46.
Id.
Id. at 1443.
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cases before them.117 Nonetheless, even though the Eleventh Circuit
recently had the opportunity to revisit its holding and change course
in Bamberger Rosenheim, Ltd. v. OA Development, Inc.,118 it
avoided addressing the issue directly.
In Bamberger, the Eleventh Circuit was faced with an appeal
from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.119
The case involved Bamberger Rosenheim, Ltd. (“Profimex”), an Israeli company focused on raising capital for real estate investments,
and OA Development, Inc. (“OAD”), a Georgia real estate developer.120 Profimex and OAD entered into a solicitation agreement
that provided for the arbitration of disputes submitted by OAD in
Tel Aviv, Israel, and for the arbitration of disputes submitted by
Profimex in Atlanta, Georgia.121 After relations between the parties
deteriorated, Profimex commenced arbitration in Atlanta against
OAD for breach of contract.122 OAD submitted a counterclaim
against Profimex alleging that it had defamed OAD in statements to
Israeli investors.123 Profimex objected to the counterclaim’s arbitration in Atlanta, arguing that pursuant to the arbitration agreement,
OAD’s claims must be arbitrated in Tel Aviv.124 The arbitrator ultimately determined that venue for the defamation counterclaim was
proper in Atlanta and found Profimex liable on OAD’s defamation
counterclaim.125
The appellant, Profimex, filed a petition to vacate the arbitrator’s
defamation award in the Northern District of Georgia, and OAD
cross-petitioned to confirm the award.126 Profimex raised several
grounds for vacatur and defenses against confirmation, but the court
117

See generally, e.g., Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 2d
1325 (S.D. Fla. 2013); Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. v. Soskin, No. 17-21663Civ, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20096 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2019); Williams v. NCL
(Bah.) Ltd., No. 18-22774-CV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189286 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6,
2018); Pochat v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 12-22397-CIV,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119447 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2013).
118
862 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2017).
119
Id. at 1284.
120
Id. at 1286.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 1285–86.
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confirmed the award.127 Profimex argued that the district court had
erred in denying its petition to vacate the award because “the arbitral
procedure [had not been conducted] in accordance with the agreement of the parties,” contravening Article V(1)(d) of the New York
Convention.128 It also argued that the district court had erred in
denying its petition under Chapter One because the arbitrator had
exceeded its powers in violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).129
Even though this was an opportunity for the Eleventh Circuit to
further confirm or finally abandon Industrial Risk, it avoided the issue altogether by stating that it “[saw] no reason to analyze
Profimex’s arguments under the New York Convention or
§ 10(a)(4) [Chapter One] separately.”130 The court considered that
the arguments were intertwined because Profimex asserted that “the
arbitrator improperly applied the arbitral-venue provision in the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”131 The crux of both arguments, the
court considered, was the fact that OAD’s counterclaim had been
arbitrated in Atlanta, which led Profimex to argue both that the arbitral procedure had not been in accordance with the agreement of
the parties in contravention of Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention and that the arbitrator had exceeded its powers in violation
of Chapter One.132
The Eleventh Circuit initially confirmed the lower court holding
denying the vacatur petition, quoting Industrial Risk, and finding
that non-domestic awards “must be confirmed unless appellants can
successfully assert one of the seven defenses against enforcement of
the award enumerated in Article V of the New York Convention,”133
but did not expressly address whether the challenge raised under 9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) was admissible.
Therefore, even though the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Industrial
Risk’s premise that non-domestic awards can only be vacated—in
the United States—if one of the exclusive grounds of Article V of
127

Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1287.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. (quoting Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH,
141 F.3d 1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998)).
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the New York Convention is successfully asserted, it did not explicitly reject Profimex’s challenge under Chapter One of the FAA.
Whether it deliberately did so was a question that remained, for the
moment, unanswered.
The question, however, did not remain unanswered for long. Recently, the opportunity again arose for the Eleventh Circuit to correct its error in Industrial Risk. Instead of embracing the approach
taken by the majority of federal circuits, however, the Eleventh Circuit in Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del
Monte Int’l GmbH134 once again affirmed its holding in Industrial
Risk. In addition to standing by Industrial Risk, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld sanctions that were imposed on a party for having raised
what it considered “baseless” grounds for vacatur, “especially considering that INPROTSA [had] failed to assert a valid defense under
the [New York] Convention.”135 In so doing, the court’s decision
demonstrates the serious consequences that can arise from a fundamental misconception and misunderstanding of the framework applicable to the vacatur of arbitral awards discussed above.
In INPROTSA, Del Monte initiated arbitration proceedings
against INPROTSA in Miami.136 The arbitral tribunal rendered an
award in June 2016 finding that INPROTSA had breached its purchase and sale agreement with Del Monte pertaining to the production, packaging, and sale of pineapples.137 In September 2016,
INPROTSA sought to vacate the award in state court.138 The petition
was ultimately removed to federal court following Del Monte’s removal petition.139 Del Monte then moved both to dismiss the vacatur

134

Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte Int’l
GmbH (“INPROTSA 2019”), 783 F. App’x 972, 974 (11th Cir. 2019). In full
transparency, the author’s law firm, Hogan Lovells US LLP, was counsel of record for Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. in the underlying
arbitration proceedings and subsequent vacatur actions and appeals. The author,
Juan C. Garcia, worked on the matter as a member of the firm. The co-author,
Ivan Bracho Gonzalez, also worked on the matter as a summer associate for the
firm Hogan Lovells US, LLP.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 973.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
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petition and to confirm the award.140 INPROTSA, on the other hand,
moved to remand the proceeding to state court, alleging that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.141
The Southern District granted Del Monte’s motion to dismiss
INPROTSA’s vacatur petition and denied the latter’s motion to remand, concluding that its petition, based on Florida law, had “failed
to assert a valid defense under the [New York Convention], as required by [Industrial Risk].”142 In short, the court, relying on Industrial Risk, applied the grounds for denying the enforcement of an
arbitral award under the New York Convention to a vacatur petition.
The magistrate judge’s discussion and consideration of
INPROTSA’s alleged grounds for vacatur, which was implicitly
adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, was limited to stating that the petition to vacate had “not raise[d] cognizable grounds for vacatur,”
concluding that under controlling precedent from the Eleventh Circuit, namely Industrial Risk, the grounds to vacate international arbitration awards are limited to those contained in the New York
Convention.143 Despite INPROTSA’s attempts at clarifying the patent conflation by reiterating that the petition sought vacatur and that
it had appropriately relied on grounds for vacatur found in the FAA
as opposed to the New York Convention, its efforts were to no
avail.144
Based on the Southern District’s decision, Del Monte then
sought attorney’s fees “under the court’s inherent authority, claiming INPROTSA’s grounds to seek vacatur were baseless and
brought in bad faith.”145 A magistrate judge recommended granting
Del Monte’s motion, considering that “INPROTSA’s petition to vacate lacked any real basis for vacatur, and ‘amount[ed] to little more
than an assault on the Tribunal’s factfinding and contractual interpretation rather than on its actual authority.’”146 The Southern
140

Id.
Id.
142
Id. at 973–74 (emphasis added).
143
Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte Int’l
GmbH (“INPROTSA 2018”), No. 16-24275-CV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152115,
at *13 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2018); see also INPROTSA 2019, 783 F. App’x at 973–
74.
144
INPROTSA 2018, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152115, at *8–9.
145
INPROTSA 2019, 783 F. App’x at 974.
146
Id.
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District adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and confirmed the sanctions imposed upon INPROTSA based on the inherent authority of courts to sanction parties who pursue “frivolous
challenges to arbitration awards in the court system.”147
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, INPROTSA argued that the
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the motion to
vacate the arbitration award and that the lower court had abused its
discretion in awarding sanctions to Del Monte.148 After disposing of
INPROTSA’s allegation pertaining to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,149 the Eleventh Circuit, relying on Hercules Steel150 and
stating that “if a party on the short end of an arbitration award attacks
that award in court without any real legal basis for doing so, that
party should pay sanctions,” held that the district court had not
abused its discretion in awarding sanctions to Del Monte, making
no mention whatsoever of the ground for vacatur that it considered
non-existent.151
The ground for vacatur at issue, although missing from the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, was centered on INPROTSA’s allegation
that “the tribunal panel exceeded its powers by reaching an interpretation of the contract that was ‘not rationally derived from the parties’ agreement’ and was ‘completely irrational.’”152 INPROTSA’s
original vacatur petition also alleged that the panel had ignored
“Florida law applicable to restrictive covenants and damages; and
that it denied [INPROTSA] of due process by failing to give weight
to [its] defenses and evidence, specifically, a written statement of a
witness who was not subjected to cross-examination.”153
Subsequently, INPROTSA filed a certiorari petition to the
United States Supreme Court, asking the Court to settle the circuit
split over “whether the New York Convention’s defenses to confirmation provide the exclusive grounds for vacating a New York

147

Id. at 973–74.
Id. at 974.
149
Id.
150
B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 913–14 (11th
Cir. 2006).
151
INPROTSA 2019, 783 F. App’x at 974 (internal quotations omitted).
152
INPROTSA 2018, No. 16-24275-CV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152115, at
*3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2018).
153
Id.
148
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Convention award.”154 In October 2019, however, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.155 As a result, Industrial Risk remains settled law in the Eleventh Circuit, meaning that petitions seeking to
annul or vacate international arbitration awards are analyzed under
the grounds for denying enforcement set forth in the New York Convention, rather than the grounds for vacatur established in the FAA.
VI.

PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF INDUSTRIAL RISK AND ITS
PROGENY
The Eleventh Circuit’s rule emerging from Industrial Risk probably raises little-to-no concerns to the international audience, at least
from the standpoint of available grounds for annulment. As mentioned before, most jurisdictions have adopted the Model Law,156
meaning that the grounds for vacatur are identical to the grounds for
opposing enforcement of an arbitral award.157
In the United States, however, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Industrial Risk can have significant consequences, as exemplified in
the INPROTSA case. Industrial Risk limits the right of parties to
challenge non-domestic arbitration awards by denying a party the
right to raise grounds for vacatur under the law of the arbitral seat,
including the grounds for vacatur under the FAA. 158 Further, Industrial Risk not only eliminates the grounds for vacatur under Chapter
One of the FAA, but it also prevents parties from asserting implied
or non-statutory grounds for vacatur such as “manifest disregard of
the law” and “arbitrary and capricious,” among others.159
Additionally, Industrial Risk evidences a lack of understanding
by the Eleventh Circuit of the operative federal arbitration
154

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical
INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte Int’l GmbH, 2019 WL 3380417, at *15 (U.S. July
25, 2019) (No. 19-117).
155
Inversiones y Procesadoa Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte Int'l
GmbH, 140 S. Ct. 124 (2019).
156
See supra Part III.A.
157
Compare UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 44, art. 34, with New York
Convention, supra note 13, art. V.
158
Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434,
1443, 1445–46 (11th Cir. 1998).
159
See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION
317–18 (4th ed. 2004).
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framework and the subsequent interplay that exists—or should exist—between Chapters One and Two of the FAA. Such erroneous
interpretation negates the intent of the framers of the Convention not
to bind themselves to exclusive grounds for annulment and renders
the residual clause of the FAA meaningless.160
Finally, another important—and often overlooked—consequence of Industrial Risk affects the Panama Convention, incorporated in Chapter 3 of the FAA.161 The Panama Convention is considered as part of “the supreme law of the land” by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause found in Article VI of the Constitution.162 The
former, which is also applicable to non-domestic arbitral awards,
also contains grounds for denying enforcement just as the New York
Convention.163 Yet, the Eleventh Circuit in Industrial Risk categorically stated that an appeal of an arbitral motion must be denied unless an appellant “can successfully assert one of the seven defenses
against enforcement of the award enumerated in Article V of the
New York Convention.”164 Taking the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale
at face value, it then should follow that the Panama Convention provides the grounds for annulment in cases where the Panama Convention applies. While it is true that the grounds for annulment listed
in both Conventions are identical, the result is the same: the Eleventh Circuit, through Industrial Risk, explicitly ignored and negated
the full force and effect of the Panama Convention, a treaty placed
on equal footing with the New York Convention and which also
constitutes “the supreme law of the land.”165
As a result, the Eleventh Circuit remains an outlier amongst the
Circuit Courts in the United States. While most of the country’s Circuit Courts have determined that federal arbitration law can be applied to vacate non-domestic awards, the Eleventh Circuit stands

160

See Samra, supra note 40, at 379.
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan.
30, 1975, 1483 U.N.T.S. 249; 9 U.S.C. §§ 301–07 (2018).
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U.S. CONST. art. VI.
163
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 161, art. 5.
164
Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Guttehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998).
165
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alone affirming that no defense or ground for vacatur exists outside
the New York Convention.166
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